Razlogov, ki kontekstualizirajo pomembnost številke ČKZ o rasizmu, je veliko oziroma jih je preveč. Rasizem političnih strank in skupin se je iz obskurnosti, kamor so ga postavili zmaga nad nacifašizmom v drugi svetovni vojni, protikolonialna gibanja in gibanja za državljanske pravice, prestavil v samo središče političnega odločanja. Namesto da bi politične elite okrog rasizma zgradile cordon sanitaire, je njihova politična tehnologija prav nasprotna; rasizem so ponotranjile in razmere normalizirale do mere, ko so rasistične politične stranke del evropskega parlamenta in drugih institucij odločanja. To so naredile v imenu demokracije, svobode mišljenja in delovanja. V zadnjem desetletju spremljamo krepitev desničarskih in skrajno desničarskih političnih strank, ki se jim volilni rezultati vidno izboljšujejo. To je še zlasti očitno od leta 2008. V tem času so prav tako okrepile članstvo in vidnost v javnosti paramilitaristične, skrajno desničarske skupine na vzhodu, zahodu, severu in jugu Evrope, ki na zaprtih taborih malikujejo fašizem in nacizem, v javnem življenju pa žanjejo odobravanje s sklicevanjem na patriotizem. Menda naj ne bi bilo nič rasističnega v strankah in gibanjih, ki izganjajo migrante, Rome, pozivajo k linču LGBT-oseb, slavijo vojno in holokavst. Kakor da ekstremistične stranke in skupine nimajo ničesar opraviti z rasizmom, kvečjemu z »dobrim nacionalizmom« (tj. zahodnim in liberalnim, v nasprotju s slabim, vzhodnim in neliberalnim),1 zagotovo pa s patriotizmom, ljubeznijo do domovine. Če že izganjajo migrante, naj bi to vendarle počeli, da bi obvarovali »nas«, ljudstvo, rojeno na svoji zemlji in vrojeno v pravo kri. Doživeli smo ponovno legitimizacijo in z njo preporod rasizma, ob hkratnem izgonu pojma rasizem iz političnega besednjaka, ko nas politične elite prepričujejo, da nič več ni rasizem. V tej številki ČKZ razkrivamo maske rasizma ter opozarjamo na njegovo živost in vseprisotnost.
Today’s European context is characterised by growing nationalism, racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia. These manifestations are de facto supported by mainstream parties such as the German CDU-CSU, the British Conservative Party, the French UMP and also Socialist Party (by way of example, we can quote the declarations of current Prime Minister Manuel Valls on the Roma people). However, they are more openly promoted by different parties and movements that are generally defined as right-wing populists. The term “populist” has in fact progressively replaced “fascist” to define far or radical right-wing movements and parties such as, for example, the Front National in France, expressing the “more covert” forms of racism, which can be broadly defined as “cultural racism”. Fascism—or, more precisely neo-fascism—has not disappeared in the meantime: having over the years readapted its ideology and its symbols, it is still a minoritarian component in the European political arena. This paper considers the differences and similarities between neo-fascism and right-wing “populist” movements, focusing on the Italian case, which can be instructive due to the old tradition of fascism and neo-fascism, dating back to the forties (the years immediately following World War II), and the presence of a right-wing populist force, the Northern League, whose anti-immigration message (more recently combined with strong anti-euro and anti-EU positions) is at the core of its programme.
The article focuses on the question of today’s role of racism and racist discrimination, and attempts to discuss the relationship between ideology and act (deed) in cases of individual and collective violent deeds. The main question is whether racism represents above all an ideology, and if so, what kind of ideology this is and to which end it serves. Is racism in the first place an ideology of hatred that changes ideas and words into deeds, into violence, i.e. is racism above all an ideological blueprint for violence that emerges from hatred? On the basis of the thesis on neoracisms as cultural racisms, the article first drafts the contemporary understanding of racism as racism without the race. The second part is dedicated to the analysis of racist ideological features that emerged in the preparation of collective violence in cases of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and to the question how those experiences could help understand today’s role of racism(s). The main observation is that violence did not emerge from the ideological/racist constructions of (elusive) enemies, but that racist constructions represented complex constructs of inequality that served as buffers against (political) responsibility. In the contemporary global world, such constructs above all justify racist institutions and deeds. In the conclusion, the EU anti-racist policy, which focuses on racist ideology like hate speech and hate crime and leaves the inconvenient questions of systematic structural racism of EU laws and institutions aside, is questioned.
The text analyzes the emergence of the extreme right-wing movement Pegida in Germany; on the one hand, the author takes a look at Pegida through the strategy of culturalisation, i.e., the displacement of class antagonism that predominantly takes form in Islamophobia and hatred of immigrants, while simoultaneously obfuscating the long-term effects of a class compromise after 2002 with which the German context saw the introduction of gradual regime of neoliberal austerity. The analysis of neoliberal regime can be useful also to understand the relative “success” of the German economy in the current crisis. It is argued that Pegida is not simply an abberation from the official politics, and it is not simply a name that stands for unreflected and “concerned citizens” as the dominant politicians and media defined them. Rather, Pegida should be understood as a symptom of the austerity regime that intesified exploitation of working classes and deepened social inequalities across Germany; also, Pegida is a right-wing political response to a higher economic insecurity within the EU crisis, and that at least to some degree took shape in the new political party AfD (Alternative for Germany).
The author discusses the “conspiracy theories” that were asserted in Slovenia with the onset of modernisation at the end of the 19th century. The basic idea of the paper is that “conspiracy theories” were built on the very creation of modern political thought in Slovenia, and that they hitherto remain intrinsic to the Slovenian political life as a concept of political mobilisation. The article brings a short history of the Jews in Slovenia and the forms of anti-Semitism in Slovenia. Rather distinctively, the Jews in this area historically never played an important social, economic, cultural or political role. In different historic periods, Jewish population was very low or even non-existent. The “case of Slovenia” thus confirms the thesis that throughout the European history anti-Semitism has never really been in balance with the number of Jews and their influence within a society. Otherwise, the Slovenian anti-Semitism had been taken over from elsewhere, mainly from the cultural areas of Central Europe; in the Slovenian case, we can also find different kinds of anti-Semitic influences, and the stigmatized image of Judaism played an important role in various ideologies.
Slovenian Anti-Semitism, Buried Alive in the Ideology of Slovenian National Reconciliation
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Following 1991, the ideology of national reconciliation as formulated by philosopher Spomenka Hribar during the 1980s became part and parcel of the Slovenian postsocialism transition. The interpretation of the confessional clash on the occupied Slovenian soil during WWII that the ideology adopts had, and still has, numerous legal, political, cultural and social consequences. In accord with the historical essence of the Slovenian biopolitics that insists on pseudo-biological understandings of social continuities, the reconciliation ideology affirms a specific type of historic revisionism whose central point is a total silence on pre-war confessional and ideological anti-Semitism on the part of the then-Slovenian Catholic Church and its close ally, the Slovenian People’s Party. The ideology of reconciliation likewise totally suppresses the wartime persecution of Slovenian Jews in the hands of collaborationist authorities, as well as post-war programmatic anti-Semitism of the revolutionary authorities. With this complete omission, the reconciliation idea not only entirely missed its declared goal, to “accept our history,” but decontextualised the history itself, and with it, distorted it. Although the idea of reconciliation in this ideational framework is a glaring political failure, it has, paradoxically, sucessfully established itself as the diacritic between the closely complementary transition political left and right even as both are, since 1991, entirely devoted to neoliberal ideologies and politics.
Normalization of Racism through the Language of Democracy: the Case of the Slovenian Democratic Party
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The article addresses the question of what kind of discursive strategies enable political parties the proliferation of racist and xenophobic ideas, in terms of a democratic society and within established politics. Theoretically, it is based on studies of racism, populism and the radical right. In the empirical part, elements of racism and (radical-right) populism in the discourse of the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) are analysed, with particular focus on the othering discourse. The discourse analysis includes interviews of party representatives and texts published on party’s websites. The SDS discourse analysis shows that the party articulates social problems through the use of nationalist, nativist and essentialist arguments, and proliferates and normalizes xenophobic and racist ideas by reproducing minorities and political opponents as threats to the Slovenian culture, values and lifestyle, as well as threats to the party itself.
For the Well-Being of the People: Far-Right Populism in the Discourse of the Party New Slovenia
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The paper explores how populism functions in combination with Christian Democratic ideology in the case of the political party New Slovenia (Nova Slovenija). We analyze party’s discourse and thereby focus on the questions on what arguments, ideas and ideologies it is based, how the party frames social problems and solutions, and how the party enforces discrimination of minority groups. The analysis includes interviews with the representatives of the party and texts the party published on its webpages. As a research method, we use critical frame analysis and discourse analysis. Forms of action against minorities, reproductions of antagonisms between the people and “others” and nativist understanding of the state and citizenship show partly overlaping of actions and discourse of New Slovenia with radical right populism.
It's the End of the World as we Know it: Populist Strategies of the Family Code Opponents
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The starting hypothesis is connected to the new role of the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) in policy discussions on issues related to sexual citizenship: RCC is secularizing its image and discourse by establishing satellite organizations working on its behalf, in order to clericalize society. One of such satellite organizations is the Civil Initiative for the Family and Rights of Children (CIFRC), which was the main opponent of the new Family Code. In this paper we use critical frame analysis in order to analyze CIFRC’s discourse, placing it in the context of political homophobia and populist action. The central framework of CIFRC’s discourse was a creation of homosexuality as a threat — first in relation to the “innocent” children, but also in relation to the “real” family. Their discourse contains simple problem-solution binaries, in which the problem can be solved by (legal, symbolic, physical) removal of those who are constituted as a problem in the first place (homosexuals). In the concluding part of the article, we contextualize the results of the study by introducing a broader European dimension of conservative mass movements against so-called theory or ideology of gender. This is a new chapter in the battle against human rights of LGBT-persons, in which language and concepts, which were until recently used by the proponents of gender equality and human rights of LGBT-persons, are now (ab)used by conservative forces.
The article explores the question how different perceptions of time are reflected in media discourse on family, in the context of the Family Code campaign, which took place in March 2012. The author notes that a part of proponents and opponents of the Family Code formed their beliefs on “real family” on a dualistic structure of cyclical and linear temporal perception. On one side, there is the traditional (or nuclear) family concept, and on the other, there are all other forms of family (same-sex, single parent, etc.). Both groups are placed in a hierarchical relationship, named the value dualism of cyclical and linear time perception. Such a dualism in practice justifies the distinction between real and quasi (true, false) family forms and allows the implementation of a different legal and social status for different family forms. In conclusion, the author presents the concept of evential time perception, which breaks with the idea of identity as a fixed entity and sees it more as fluid and variable identification, specifically—in current terminology—as events (family, human, culture). The elaborated theoretical idea of evential time is presented as a new time paradigm, overcoming the value dualism.
The article deals with generic fascism and simultaneously devotes attention to fascist ideology. The author claims that the concept of generic fascism can be used as an umbrella term, and that various neofascist, national-socialist and far-right movements can be classified under this term. The author also focuses on fascist ideology, which he finds a fluid and continuous process, which, through time, assumes various forms and permutations. The aim of this article is, firstly, to introduce both typologically multidimensional and minimalist definitions through the concept of generic fascism based on national-socialist movement, and secondly, to upgrade the current theory of generic fascism. In the first part, the author introduces the concept of generic fascism, its main features and advantages, and then links them with the mimicry of fascist ideology. In the second part, the author deals with the case of Autonomous Nationalists, and afterwards with the local fraction called the Autonomous Nationalists of Slovenia. In the final segment, the author presents pros and cons of using the concept of generic fascism.
The article draws attention to the problem of self-proclaimed “patriotic” groups, which in Slovenia use patriotism to legitimize intolerant nationalist and racist as well as homophobic rhetoric and action. It is a case study of the “patriotic” groups entitled Here is Slovenia, which serves to highlight the connection between patriotism, nationalism and racism. This movement is characterized by its strong emphasis on young people, to whom Here is Slovenia speaks through a variety of programs, campaigns and socializing events. The article situates this case in discussions of nationalist and racist tendencies that enable the promotion of intolerant and hateful messages based on a primordial understanding of the nation as a homogeneous ethno-cultural community. Symbols, ideology, discourse and operation of the project Here is Slovenia are analyzed by examining the group's history and overview of its main activities, exposing the role of the Internet and social networks, in particular Facebook. The paper complements this with an analysis of interviews with (former) members and supporters, whose narratives allow a rare insight into the thinking that otherwise remains outside dominant discursive practices.
Ali je o nekaterih ekstremnih nacionalističnih in desničarskih organizacijah utemeljeno reči, da so rasistične, ne da bi vas te lahko kazensko preganjale? Dve sodbi v primeru organizacije Hervardi, ki se je odločila preganjati novinarja Mladine in pozneje RTV Slovenija, Erika Valenčiča, nazorno nakazujeta, da je to mogoče.
Valenčič je bil v začetku leta 2015 zaslišan na državnem tožilstvu zaradi suma izdaje tajnih podatkov v dokumentarnem filmu Koalicija sovraštva. Branil se je z molkom, na vprašanja ni odgovarjal. Že vrsto let pa se, tako kot v navedenem filmu, ukvarja z obstojem domačih ekstremističnih organizacij – tako je za Mladino 22. aprila 2010 napisal članek z enakim naslovom (Koalicija sovraštva), v katerem je ugotavljal, da je v Sloveniji zaznati širjenje neonacističnih in podobnih rasističnih skupin. Po njegovem večino druži organiziranje pod pretvezo ali krinko domoljubja. Še več, te skupine dobro sodelujejo med seboj in tudi z neonacisti iz tujine. V Mladininem članku je naštel naslednje: Blood&Honour, Headhunters Domžale, Slovenski radikali, Tu je Slovenija in Hervardi. Pri zadnjih dveh je dodal pridevnik »rasističen«. Valenčič je zanje zelo decidirano zapisal: »A v osnovi so rasisti in nestrpneži.«
Populist extreme right parties (PERPs) have become an important part of politics, not only at the national level but also in the European Union. With the 2014 elections, the number of PERPs MEPs increased, extreme parties have won the elections in France and Denmark, and for the first time there will be openly neo-Nazi parties in the parliament. The overview of election results, formation of alliances, and data on the activity of PERPs in the previous EP mandate enables us to recognize the influence of these parties on European politics. The analysis shows that, as in the previous EP mandate, the PERPs in the new one are not going to have a strong influence on the policies of the EP due to the variety of ideologies and consequent inability to form strong alliances and act cohesively as parliamentary groups. The PERPs are going to have representatives mostly in the group of non-attached MEPs, which means they are entitled to less public funds and have smaller influence. However, their increase in number could enable them to delay decision-making processes and express their extreme worldviews even more effectively. Their populism based on the exclusion of the Other is the reason these parties focus on immigration and ethnic minority issues and express anti-Islamic views. Racist discourses, which are not condemned or are even reproduced by mainstream parties, represent a threat to the European democracy.
‘Modern day blackshirts’ in Greece and the UK: hate strategies and actions against the ‘other’
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The activities of extreme right political groups and their relationship with cases of victimisation of so-called ‘others’ are the main focus of this article. Following the rise of racism, violence, and hate speech towards minority groups based on people’s national, ethnic, religious, sexual and political identities, the article examines the engagement in violence or incitement of violence in the case of two political groups: Golden Dawn from Greece and the English Defence League from the UK. From the ‘national demonstrations’ of EDL, a street movement, to the ‘Committee of National Memory’ of GD, a political party that emerged as a third force in the national parliament, the challenge of how to perceive the activism of such groups in institutionalised democracies is highlighted. Based on the analysis of the two cases it is argued that with the idea of the nation at the centre of their construction, the phenomenon of such groups sheds light on a contemporary and popularised version of hate crimes spreading across Europe.
The article investigates different articulations of racism in right-wing populist discourses in Austria. The paper is based on four case studies focusing on the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), its youth organisation (RFJ), the new-right Identitarian Movement Austria (IBÖ) and a number of NGOs campaigning against (the building of) mosques or Islamic centres. We employed critical frame analysis of texts published online by these four organisations, done in the framework of two projects co-funded by the EU. In this paper we focus on argumentative strategies and patterns of meaning-making relating to frames based on ‘othering’, ethnicisation, and racism, which account for about half of the main frames in the right-wing populist discourses analysed. A closer reading of these discursive strategies shows three distinct modes of racist articulation: forms of anti-Muslim racism, ethnopluralism and xeno-racism. These forms of racist articulations differ not only with regard to the groups that are stigmatised as ‘others’, but also with regard to the racist logic applied and to the functions they are meant to perform within right-wing populist discourses. While anti-Muslim racism is above all a means of creating a positive self-image, ethnopluralism presents a coherent ideology. Xeno-racism on the other hand works mainly as a means of naturalising privileges of natives and strengthening right-wing populists’ discursive hegemony. These empirical findings can be related to theoretical debates on racism and support claims for inclusion of ‘new’, ‘differentialist’ forms in its definition as an analytical concept.
The article summarizes the development and the growth of extreme-right and neo-Nazi groups and parties in Central and Eastern Europe following the fall of socialism. In spite of this, the general public is still indifferent, and the mass media do not pay enough attention to this problem. The media in Central and Eastern Europe deal with attacks of extreme-right groups individually or in individual countries, while the main problem is that various xenophobic and neo-Nazi groups make acquaintance, socialize, exchange experiences and coordinate actions and work at the international level. This can bee seen in attacks on homosexuals, Roma and members of other minorities, joint participation in violent demonstrations, the same dress style and the same slogans, etc. The article draws particular attention to the situation in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, where neo-Nazi or extreme right-wing groups are gaining more and more social impact.
The article analyzes neo-racism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a direct result of the political structure of the country. The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, drafted under the Dayton Agreement, does not define BiH as a country of its citizens, but as a country of ethnically pure groups, mainly Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and members of minority groups. The country continually reproduces neo-racism and the marginalization of its citizens, because the primary purpose of ethno-nationalist policies is to ensure the unity of a particular ethnic group. In this society, human rights are limited to collective rights, and the individual becomes entirely irrelevant. By analyzing policies and discourses of political parties, and analyzing the educational system and media freedom, the author focuses on the tools used for ideological control, which produces neo-racism. The article also analyzes neo-racist discrimination in state symbols and state holidays. In the end, the author discusses the possibility of the abolition of the Dayton Agreement. Examples of respect and solidarity between people, in the author's opinion, are the most suitable basis for the fight against neo-racism. The article concludes that the ethno-nationalist political divide remains strong, and that it is not likely that, in the near future, Bosnia and Herzegovina will abolish the Dayton Agreement, and with it the neo-racist discrimination against its citizens.
The article presents tendencies of Holocaust denial among secondary school pupils in Slovenia. It focuses on research implemented in January 2012, in which 400 Slovenian secondary school pupils were included. In spite of the assumption that Holocaust denial amongst the youth in Slovenia already exists, we also assumed that a degree of Holocaust denial amongs Slovenian pupils is lower that amongst their peers in other EU countries. Research also inquired about the level of anti-Semitism in conjunction with Holocaust denial. The research project confirmed that students on lower levels of high school education and with less history and sociology lessons in curriculum are more receptive for the Holocaust denial and anti-Semitism is more present in this demographic. The level of Holocaust denial amongst secondary school pupils is not negligible; it suggests that this topic should be more thoroughly discussed in secondary schools.
The paper deals with the issue of effective anti-racism teaching in everyday contexts, where the traditional forms of racism are replaced by more sophisticated, subtle practices of exlusion, hatred and violence. Historical connotations of terms such as racism, xenophobia, homophobia, etc. specifically characterize certain groups of people and somehow further deepen divisions between the hegemonic majority and the oppressed minority; therefore, several indicators of inefficience in teaching anti-racism have appeared, particularly in applying theories into practices. Teaching anti-racism is presented through new attitudes towards performative pedagogy, for a long time understood in the context of the teacher as the actor who engage his/her students as spectators through variety of acting techniques and performative practies. Along with the theoretical and applied development of the field, more and more the performative pedagogy is recognized as a critical teaching approach, based on artistic expression, improvisation, continuous dialogue, and the body as an ideologically inscribed product.
In 2014, in cooperation with the Action and Protection Foundation, Kristóf Bodó, a practicing lawyer, and I had the opportunity to teach a course titled The Background and Social Consequences of Hate Crimes at the University of Public Service for students in the Faculty of Law Enforcement, Public Administration, and Military Sciences. The opportunity was exceptional indeed, since teaching about hate crimes in Hungary is rarely present, especially not in an institutional environment. However, this would be generally important, especially in university programmes where students are likely to encounter minority group members, human rights issues, and possible hate crimes in their future profession. All the students of the course belong to this group. The main aim of this article is to present this pilot course. To achieve this goal, I describe the pedagogical context first, then the social context and the prejudices present in Hungarian society. The aim of the first section is to place the course described within the context of human rights education using the concept and a typology of affective education. In talking about the latter, the trends of prejudice against the most vulnerable minorities are presented, and hate crimes and incidents committed in Hungary are also described. After introducing the context, the article presents the whole process from planning the curriculum to the realization of the course with all its experiences and challenges. After evaluating the experience some future prospects are presented.
In recent decades, many studies confirm the growing phenomenon of populism, racism and discrimination in Europe as well as Slovenia. Digital media and social networks are also a means of disseminating populism and hatred towards “the others”. It is therefore crucial to raise awareness among young people about media violence and at the same time to enable training for them regarding civic engagement. This was also one of the goals of international project “E-engagement against violence”, which addressed young people by participatory approach to actively co-develop a more open society. In the article, the authors reflect on the experience gained with the implementation of an educational module “Online activism and networking”, in which 111 pupils from three upper secondary schools took part. At the same time, there were 31 teachers involved in online testing of a digital platform, in which different materials are available, covering content tested in classrooms. The article confirms the need to promote cooperation between schools, national institutions related to the education system and non-governmental organizations in Slovenia, which deal with issues relevant to education. Experience from secondary schools confirmed the need for materials to reach young people more effectively, the need for training and critical thinking about populism, and encourage them to act against stereotypes.